## Intelligence-Policy Report

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, June 16—
Following is the text of the report on Intelligence and National Security made public today by the Senate Subcommittee

on National Policy Machinery: For almost a full year, the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery has been making a nonpartisan study of how our Government should best organize to develop, execute and coordinate na-tional security policies. The role of intelligence in national security policy-making has been an area of concern from the outset. The subcommittee has received the counsel of ranking Government officials and other distinguished American uniquely qualified in this field.

Long experience has established the validity of certain principles governing the relationship of intelligence activities to national security policy.

The future work of the subcommittee will include recommendations, classified where required, for improving the review and coordination of intelligence activities and national security planning. Our work will be guided by the following tested principles:

1. The free world need intelligence activities to assure its survival. Intelligence is as important as armed strength. In this age of push-button weapons, intelligence is more than ever our first line of defense.

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2. Intelligence operations are instruments of national policy. They must be subject to effective and continuing higher review and coordination. This includes a weighing of gains against risks.

3. The collection and evalu-

ation of intelligence is a job for professionals. Intelligence organization should be tight, centralized, responsive and, to the greatest possible ex-

tent, anonymous.
4. Officials who depend upon intelligence must be professional in handling problems which it raises.

5. The conduct of diplomacy must be insulated from sensiintelligence operations. Intelligence is a source of information for diplomacy—not a part of it.

6. Public revelation of sensitive intelligence is never a harmless set. It both leavard—

harmless act. It both jeopardizes the normal conduct of foreign relations and compro-mises the sources of vital in-telligence. If public state-ments have to be made at all, they must be made only in response to overriding national interest and on the respon-sibility and under the control from the outset of one high authority.

telligence is silence. More can be lost by saying too much, too soon, than by saying too little, too slowly.

Recent events have not al-

tered the need for adherence to these principles. They have, in fact, attested to their wis-

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